A Theological Consideration of the Fundamental Option and Moral Epistemology Could We Regard Ourselves as Good People if Moral Knowledge is Impossible?

Bruno Matos - Pregledni rad

Teološko promišljanje temeljnog opredjeljenja i moralna epistemologija. Možemo li smatrati sebe kao dobre ljude ako je moralna spoznaja nemoguća?

Abstract
The paper analyses the justification of personal integrity in ethical theories in contemporary moral epistemology. In the first chapter we present a theological consideration of the fundamental option that illustrates the complexity of agency of moral knowledge in the epistemic evaluation of a moral act as a specifically human conduct. Then, in the second chapter we briefly describe the inference and the structure of moral knowledge in ethical theories. In the last chapter, we argue why our personal integrity, our own understanding of it in self-estimation is related to the possibility of moral knowledge. We claim that moral knowledge is crucial in development of moral integrity of a person. The speculations on the possibility of their inference and cognitive capacity reflect on the epistemic disposition of the human being as a moral agent. Although ethical theories have offered a scientifically and methodologically precise frame to justify the truthfulness of moral knowledge and judgments, they have not anticipated the important fact of integrity between the intention, free will and practical reason.

Sadržaj
Predmet rasprave u ovom članku je vezan za problem osobnog integriteta u etičkim teorijama u suvremenoj moralnoj epistemologiji. U prvom dijelu smo predstavili teološko razmatranje temeljenog opredjeljenja koje ilustrira složenost djelovanja moralne spoznaje za epistemičko vrednovanje moralnog čina kao specifičnog ljudskog čina. Stoga smo u drugom opisali u kratkim crtama izvođenje i strukturu moralne spoznaje u etičkim teorijama. U zadnjem dijelu, pokušali smo opravdati postavku o povezanosti opravdanja našeg osobnog integriteta, našeg razumijevanja vlastite pravednosti s etičkim spekulacijama o vjerojatnosti moralne spoznaje.